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Charity and the end of empire: British Non-Governmental Organisations, Africa and 
international development in the 1960s1 
 
In 1959, the British charity, Oxfam, was a small humanitarian agency devoted to dealing with 
refugees and emergency relief within Europe. Just five years later its income had more than 
quadrupled and it was channelling substantial funds to long-term overseas aid and development 
projects. It particularly focussed on rural poverty eradication activities in the British High 
Commission Territories of southern Africa. Across Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland 
it ran agricultural training centres, dam building programmes, school feeding schemes, forestry 
programmes and the provision of medical services to remote rural areas.2 By 1967, Oxfam had 
given over £1million to the three territories and the British charitable contribution as a whole 
to Bechuanaland and Basutoland amounted to between one-third and one-quarter of the UK 
government’s official spending on the Territories through the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Fund.3 
 None of this took place according to any grand scheme that set out a particular role for 
charity in the alleviation of global poverty. Rather, through the incremental, ad hoc, yet rapid 
expansion of its practices on the ground, Oxfam was redefining humanitarianism from its 
emergency to ‘alchemical’ character, as Michael Barnett puts it: that is, from the short term 
relief of poverty to the long term attempt to tackle its underlying causes.4 This article examines 
from a British perspective this redefinition of humanitarianism in the crucial decade of 
decolonisation and development in the 1960s. It is part of a broader story that involves various 
national, international and transnational actors. Voluntary associations such as Oxfam, CARE, 
World Vision, Save the Children, Médecins Sans Frontières, Catholic Relief Services, and the 
Red Cross/Red Crescent all now operate in dozens of countries, employ tens of thousands of 
staff and raise billions of dollars from a mass donating public. Once minor appendages to 
official humanitarian relief operations such as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration (UNRRA), charities – or non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as they have 
become increasingly known - have become some of the major players in global poverty 
reduction. The following essay focuses on Britain’s three largest charities – the Save the 
Children Fund (SCF, founded in 1919), Oxfam (1942) and Christian Aid (1945) – which, by 
the end of the 1960s, had a combined income equivalent to over £100 million today, easily 
dwarfing the rest of the UK sector combined.5 They had secured for themselves a foothold in 
the official machinery of aid that would continue to expand alongside unofficial forms of 
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assistance more generally: right through to today’s world of billionaire donations, philanthro-
capitalism and celebrity humanitarianism. 
 However, amidst all this expansion there was little agreement as to what the precise 
roles of charities and NGOs should be in the alleviation of global poverty and inequality. The 
relationship between charity and the state across the empire at the moment of decolonisation 
was never articulated as clearly in thought or in practice as it had been in Britain itself.6Indeed, 
it is this very ambiguity about the proper role of charity that explains its success in becoming 
a key solution for tackling global poverty. Charities have been many things to many people. 
For donors they were a route through which liberal internationalist sympathies could be 
directed. For aid workers, the modern NGO became a new way to realise age-old desires to be 
doing something constructively and immediately. For late colonial officials they were the 
agents that would step in where the state retreated, providing vital lessons in self-help for the 
future leaders of the country. For newly independent governments, they were both suppliers of 
western funds and props to impoverished social service departments. For those missionaries 
and imperialists who stayed on, they were a means to give something back to the country they 
had come to love and a channel through which older forms of colonial knowledge, expertise 
and belief could be utilised.  
 This essay approaches the subject of humanitarian charity from many of these 
perspectives. It is possible to do so because of the opening up of some significant new archives 
in Britain, especially those of Oxfam, Save the Children and Christian Aid. Of course, there 
are risks here of telling history purely from an institutional perspective. But most charities in 
the 1960s underwent tortuous internal wrangling over their proper role and function, or what 
constituted the full extent of their charitable remit. Their archives therefore pointedly illuminate 
a sector in transition and a key moment in humanitarianism’s ongoing redefinition. More 
importantly, the staggering amounts of paperwork they generated, including field reports, 
assessments of specific projects, related materials generated by partner organisations, agencies 
and governments allow insights into the history of humanitarian aid from perspectives other 
than those of the donor, especially when read alongside memoirs, contemporary accounts and 
governmental and intergovernmental records. It means a better sense of the role of charitable 
humanitarianism can be built that has in mind both their relationships with other agencies back 
home and around the world and with their recipients on the ground. 
 The details from the archive deny the usefulness of any one over-riding interpretation. 
NGOs and charities were not simply the pawns in a game dominated by the interests of Cold 
War protagonists, colonial officials, postcolonial elites or even the diverse concerns of the 
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donating public. All of these factors played a role, as did charitable interventions on the ground, 
and so it is necessary to examine their complex roles from many angles if we are to understand 
how ambiguity drove their expansion. Accordingly, a first section focuses on the enrolment of 
British charities into the official machinery of aid during the United Nations’ first Development 
Decade of the 1960s. Despite later attempts to position NGOs as offering an ‘alternative’ 
approach to development it will be seen that charities were closely connected to the official 
machinery of aid and development, especially through the UN Food and Agricultural 
Organisation’s (FAO) Freedom From Hunger Campaign. Second, charities were a product of 
empire. From the expansion of social welfare by colonial governments in the 1930s through to 
decolonisation in the 1960s, there was a proliferation of aid projects which funded both modern 
NGOs and their predecessors in mission and charity. A case study of the High Commission 
Territories of southern Africa emphasises the interconnected nature of the late colonial state 
and the expanding NGO sector.  Third, charitable solutions to global poverty were further 
embraced by new postcolonial states. Deliberate decisions were taken to divert resources to 
key aspects of national planning, often leaving gaps in the provision of social welfare which 
charities were invited to fill. It was at this moment, especially, that the ad hoc and ambiguous 
nature of NGOs came to the fore, as they began to find themselves in increasingly complex 
local circumstances buffeted by the interests and directions of governments of many kinds: 
global, colonial, national and civic. Amidst such complexity, whether charitable aid actually 
worked became only one consideration of many others. Indeed, a fourth section will show that 
knowledge as to whether NGO-administered aid was actually working was scant throughout 
the 1960s, and for many years after.7 But at the time this was no bar to what many imagined 
the potential benefits of charitable development to be. All had an interest in ‘cultivating 
success’, as Grace Carswell puts it in her study of colonial Uganda, and in maintaining and 
expanding the NGO presence in Africa, especially at this time in the High Commission 
Territories.8 That the reality could be ambiguous and the results disappointing was not the 
concern in these optimistic early years of development discourse. 
As David Mosse explained in his recent ethnography of aid policy and practice,  in 
‘cultivating development’ what remains key is ‘the control over the interpretation of events’.9 
That all could be seen to be doing something, and doing it through charitable agencies most 
likely to appear beyond the political battles of development assistance and Cold War 
geopolitics, ensured the continuation of the NGO presence. The turn to NGOs was, as Susan 
Pedersen has argued of the League of Nations Mandates, a ‘system in motion’ in which what 
was ‘said’ by the global development agencies ‘bumped up against the aims, claims and 
  4 
     
 
interests of the powers and peoples with which it was involved’.10 The one constant in such a 
similarly confusing landscape was the increasing acceptability of NGOs in the provision of 
social welfare programmes across the developing world. 
   
 
When explaining the emergence of modern humanitarianism, scholars have not emphasised the 
ad hoc, ambiguous and complex roles of charities. Instead they have tended to position them 
in relation to one dominant historical interpretation. Most simply, humanitarian NGOs have 
been analysed in contrast to the supposed massive, top-down, technocratic, modernisation-
theory inflected developmentalism associated with the Cold War and the UN agencies. NGOs 
have been frequently championed as offering a bottom-up, locally-based approach.11 In 1966, 
for instance, Oxfam was telling itself that it was more ‘flexible’ than the UN agencies.12 A 
decade later, and more ambitiously, it announced it was leading ‘The Quiet Revolution’ of 
radical change from the grassroots upwards.13 Social scientists often swallowed the rhetoric 
and celebrated the potential for ‘development alternatives’ offered through NGOs. There 
remains an optimistic reading of organizations to which many scholars remain attached, either 
politically, emotionally or formally.14What such an approach does is ignore how, even within 
official development programmes, there was as much attention given to the small-scale as there 
was to the large. As Daniel Immerwahr has recently shown in his history of US aid policy in 
the middle decades of the twentieth century, this was particularly apparent in the government’s 
commitment to ‘community development’.15 
 Historians of humanitarianism have usually contrasted imperial and post-imperial 
systems of relief. A common feature of the competing periodisations is the significance 
attached to the Second World War. The conflict is regarded as a vital instigator of change, not 
only for the massive mobilisation of official aid through the UN Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration, but through the consequent creation of an architecture of global governance 
and the modern ‘invention of development’ associated with President Truman’s ‘Point Four’ 
speech.16 Undoubtedly, humanitarianism and development were reborn after the war. But as 
historians such as Bruno Cabanes and Davide Rodogno have shown, such a narrative hides the 
significance of other wars, particularly the First World War.17 And significant too were the 
important continuities that existed between the ideologies and practices of imperialism and the 
seemingly secular world of modernisation theory, human rights and development discourse.18 
In particular, an emerging group of scholars, such as Mark Mazower, Caroline Shaw, 
Kevin Grant, Tehila Sasson and Michelle Tusan, have shown from a variety of perspectives 
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that modern international humanitarianism was a product of empire.19 Voluntary organisations 
had long provided a range of social welfare services, with varying degrees of synergy with the 
colonial state. They ran prisons, hospitals, clinics, schools, leper colonies, maternal health 
centres, education programmes – all activities that extended mission into the secular realm. 
Their activities have led some to conclude that these initiatives offered either a ‘pre-history’ to 
the modern NGO, else NGOs were themselves the direct inheritors of the missionary impulse.20 
Their transition to the modern NGO was, however, facilitated over the middle decades of the 
twentieth century by the deliberate policies of decolonisation. Following the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Acts of 1929 and 1940, British colonial officials vastly expanded 
the technical apparatus necessary to economic and social development. No longer able to 
justify imperialism through racial ideology, the civilising mission or by assuming the loyalty 
of the native, development became a new means to legitimate empire. Building on Lord 
Hailey’s African Survey of 1938, British researchers and policy-makers moved into the 
continent to offer what the historian of Kenya, John Lonsdale, has described as a ‘second 
colonial occupation’ aimed to bring benefits to the colonised as well as the colonisers.21 
The continuities in personnel, systems of knowledge and technocratic practices have 
been much commented upon. This collective and scientific ‘triumph’ or ‘rule of’ expertise, as 
scholars such as Joseph Hodge,  Helen Tilley and Timothy Mitchell have argued, often became 
the basis for development policy after independence and in the new global institutions 
associated with technical assistance.22 Less acknowledged, though, is the role that charity 
played in this transfer. Financial retrenchment meant the British government published a white 
paper in 1957 on the UK’s role in Commonwealth development that cut back its own 
commitments and turned instead for assistance from within the Commonwealth itself or from 
the multilateral aid system.23 It also meant they turned to NGOs. While it could by no means 
be argued that NGOs filled the space left by the retreating state, they did at least enter it. At the 
same time, then, UN agencies such as the FAO provided a new centre of gravity that competed 
with the late colonial state in the setting of global norms and established forms of expertise. 
They created connections and exchanges that would see NGOs become very much a part of the 
‘epistemic’ or transnational community of official and non-official actors.24 As has been seen 
in a range of recent studies of population control, hunger, disease eradication, market protection 
and health policy, the interconnected nature of global governance has become more apparent.25 
NGOs were less the partners bringing an alternative plan of action, than the agents embedded 
within a dominant system of what later critics of the aid industry would characterise as  
‘neoliberal governmentality’ which NGOs – unwittingly or otherwise – have promoted and 
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perpetuated.26  Just as an imperial world order transitioned to one dominated by the UN, so 
charitable solutions to alleviate poverty not only continued but were consolidated, particularly 
within Britain’s imperial possessions across Africa. 
From missions to NGOs, then, charity has been a constant presence in both colonial 
and postcolonial world orders. Nevertheless, its continued if changing role across the middle 
decades of the twentieth century fits with what others have identified as a coherent 
chronological period, undivided by the usual reference to 1945. Indeed, historians have 
followed Frederick Cooper’s lead in recognising the period from around 1940 to 1973 as the 
‘development era’. The transfer of expert personnel and ideas about development from the 
colonial state through to the international machinery of development and to postcolonial 
governments meant a developmentalist mindset prevailed across the period. But as Cooper and 
Randall Packard acknowledged as long ago as 1997, too little is known about the actual work 
of intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations in facilitating these continuities and 
connections.27 While the official machinery of aid has attracted a growing number of historians, 
the work of NGOs, however, still requires further research. 
Crucial to this acceptance of the importance of NGOs is the concomitant role of charity 
in the ever-changing definition of humanitarianism and the evolving contexts which shaped 
how both humanitarianism and charity were imagined.28 At the end of empire non-state 
humanitarianism was transformed into a longer term commitment to aid and assist. Keith 
Watenpaugh has recently shown how, in the Near East, the humanitarian relief interventions 
of the 1920s were re-envisioned by their supporters as a ‘permanent, transnational, institutional, 
neutral, and secular regime for understanding and addressing the root causes of human 
suffering’.29 I follow this analysis, to show how charities and NGOs were also brought into this 
redefined humanitarian agenda at the end of empire. Older humanitarian agencies such as SCF 
reworked their principles, else adapted their functions to fit the new bureaucracy of 
development. Emerging agencies such as Oxfam embraced a form of liberal internationalism 
that could bypass the pressures of the Cold War and focus its energies on the seemingly 
depoliticised task of development. The changing contours of the global economy, shaken by 
war in the 1940s and rebalanced through the retreat from imperialism, created new 
opportunities for intervention which allied the technocratic impulse of the development planner 
with the older institutions of mission and empire on the ground. The rise of professional society 
and the increased authority of scientific expertise further strengthened the context for the 
emergence of a new humanitarian sensibility more geared towards long-term aid. New 
techniques became available which, as Thomas Haskell noted in his study of the transformation 
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of humanitarianism in an earlier century of capitalist formation, were able to ‘change the 
conventional limits’ within which people felt ‘responsible enough to act’.30 Just as British 
philanthropists went ‘slumming’ in the East End of London in the late-nineteenth century in 
order to see how they might assist the poor, so too did liberal internationalists, imbued with a 
technocratic eye and a professional, expert-oriented identity, seek to help the poor in regions 
of the world which matched disinterested compassion with the duties and responsibilities born 
of the legacies of empire.31 Taken together, what can be seen to emerge in the middle decades 
of the twentieth century is an optimistic transnational institutional setting to deal with the 
world’s problems within which charitable humanitarianism – and its transformation into 
development – easily resided.32  
What all this suggests is an accelerated moment in the 1960s when charities emerged 
as a viable solution to tackling global poverty. Never the product of just one historical force or 
coherent outcome of any intended plan, they emerged in the midst of the competing, complex 
and often contradictory processes associated with what Stuart Hall often referred to as a 
historical conjuncture. In this sense, charities were ‘over-determined’ in being the consequence 
of so many influences acting upon them.33 But significant too were the ‘disjunctures’ between 
policies and action that Ann Laura Stoler identified in her study of race and empire. The 
moment of decolonisation was likewise driven by ‘the discrepancies between hard-line 
prescriptions and messier practices’.34 Between official policies and grassroots situations lay 
the ambiguous function and effects of NGO actions. And just as Catherine Hall has shown how 
race had to be reworked across the empire into new, unanticipated hierarchies of difference 
after slave emancipation, so too did charitable humanitarianism have to be remade within the 
wider political economy of aid to become a new force in global development after 
independence.35 Moreover, this confusing landscape for international intervention came at a 
moment when charity’s political valency had been called into question. That is, just when 
charitable solutions to poverty on the domestic front were being eclipsed through he expansion 
of the social democratic welfare state, charity in Africa at the end of empire – for a whole 
variety of seemingly contradictory reasons – was emerging as the new ‘common sense’ in 
poverty eradication. Historical conjunctures and disjunctures therefore explain both the context 
within which charitable humanitarianism could exist, but provide too the reason its subsequent 
expansion and legitimation. As in other complex circumstances, ambiguity in role and function 
could become the actual motor of change. 
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To understand these continuities and changes it is necessary to first turn to the context of 
official development. Here, the Freedom From Hunger Campaign was crucial to how NGOs 
became a part of this redefinition of humanitarianism. The Campaign itself was very much the 
personal project of the FAO Director, Dr Binjay Ranjan Sen. Inspired by the World Refugee 
Year of 1959, the purpose was to enrol NGOs into a joint commitment to dealing with suffering 
in both the short and longer term.36 Certainly they responded. The initial list of 75 international 
NGOs attending an FAO conference in 1960 included the most prominent women’s 
organisations, trade unions, faith-based organizations and youth groups, as well as more 
technical and scientific communities with an interest in agricultural improvement.37 They then 
created national Freedom From Hunger committees around the world, and not only in the richer 
nations. However, the UK Committee, supported by every political leader and presided over 
by the Duke of Edinburgh, became the most prominent, and raised by far the greatest amount 
of funds internationally.38 
 Freedom From Hunger transformed the humanitarian sector in Britain. First, it appealed 
to more general interest organisations such as the United Nations Association and various 
women’s groups. Around 70 organisations would formally affiliate to the UK Committee.39 It 
offered a means for engaging with internationalist causes, less tainted by the divisive politics 
of the Cold War, which had elsewhere reined in their internationalist enthusiasms.40 Second, it 
was embraced by the leading humanitarian NGOs. Particularly associated with Oxfam, 
Christian Aid and War on Want, it enabled them to reorient their activities away from 
emergency relief towards long-term development. It also dragged other, more reluctant, NGOs 
such as SCF into the development fold. Finally, it captured the public imagination. Over 1,000 
local Freedom From Hunger Committees were established and over £7 million was raised 
between 1960 and 1965. The sheer scale of success of its publicity meant NGOs found 
themselves constantly in search of new projects in order to spend the amounts raised.41 
 On first reading, the Campaign appears as a classic instance of Cold War modernist 
technocratic developmentalism. Certainly, it borrowed the language of official aid projects 
associated with technical assistance. Officials spoke of calories, nutrition, education and public 
health while publicity materials set out the problems of hunger, disease, squalor and 
overpopulation before proclaiming ‘science already has the answers’.42 But it was also imbued 
with a missionary fervour with Sen in particular setting the messianic tone. He believed it had 
unleashed ‘a great force of constructive indignation and determination’ that would eventually 
‘abolish poverty’.43 His 1963 manifesto proclaimed freedom from hunger to be ‘man’s first 
fundamental human right’.44 The Campaign provided the catalyst for the first of many World 
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Food Congresses and Sen pushed hard to ensure Freedom From Hunger was renewed for 
another five years in 1965 and again at the end of the decade.45 
 But it was in the complex institutional interactions that a new role for charity was being 
forged. Indeed,  in the detailed aspects of its work it is possible to see the close connections the 
Campaign fostered between the UN infrastructure, the British state, colonial governments and 
NGOs. First, the Colonial Office was keen for Freedom From Hunger to succeed. It was 
actually the British government that first sponsored Sen’s proposal to the FAO and Sen would 
approach it again to back his plans for its renewal.46 The state oversaw the creation of the UK 
National Committee, enabling it to provide an umbrella organisation for the NGO community. 
This body not only allowed government officials to keep abreast of developments within the 
charitable sector, it also allowed it to gently dissuade more radical voices from pursuing a more 
independent voice. Despite the politicisation of the NGOs in the 1960s, when Oxfam and 
Christian Aid took on more lobbying and advocacy roles, the government was still able to 
maintain a regular dialogue through the Voluntary Committee on Overseas Aid and 
Development (VCOAD) which the new Ministry of Overseas Development helped form in 
1965.47 Even more importantly, in the first years of the Campaign, it was able to provide much 
needed introductions to officials throughout the colonies who were looking to support projects 
that could no longer attract UK funds and which FAO financing did not fully cover.48 
 Second, the Campaign fostered greater collaboration among NGOs as a whole. The 
connections made through the UK Committee made it easier to establish the Disasters 
Emergency Committee in 1963 (which co-ordinated fundraising across the sector in response 
to emergencies), VCOAD and later the more politically-motivated organisations led by the 
more radical elements in War on Want, Oxfam and Christian Aid, such as the Haslemere Group 
in 1968 and the World Development Movement in 1969, both of which lobbied for greater 
official aid. These collaborations provided the institutional infrastructure through which NGOs 
were able to speak with government officials at either the national or international level, 
particularly after the appointment of Barbara Castle as Britain’s first overseas aid minister in 
1965. Important debates took place within NGOs about the independence they should exercise 
from government. But the advantages of maintaining close contact with a wider development 
machinery through bodies such as Freedom From Hunger meant they did not seek to shut any 
doors that had only just been opened to them.49 
 This feature became apparent in the third consequence of the Campaign: the types of 
projects undertaken and the huge injections of cash it enabled. The UK Committee oversaw 
the implementation of 363 projects over the 1960s. The projects were incredibly diverse. They 
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ranged from loans to Antiguan fishermen, to a mechanics school in India to cattle and seed 
provision in Korea. The NGOs embarked on schemes approved by the FAO which went way 
beyond the traditional remit of British humanitarian agencies. But many of the larger schemes, 
or countries in which various schemes were packaged together, tended to be in former or soon-
to-be independent colonial territories. In the first five years, Oxfam and Christian Aid alone 
spent over £400,000 in Kenya. India received between £800,000 and £900,000 from a whole 
host of NGOs working in tandem with UN organisations and the other non-UK NGOs such as 
the US-based Catholic Relief Services. The Colonial Office took up development plans from 
officials in various territories, ran them past the FAO in Rome and then assisted their packaging 
into smaller projects that could obtain the backing of the UK Committee or an individual NGO. 
At this moment, the Southern Africa High Commission Territories became a particular concern 
as their economies were eclipsed by the superior power of the Republic of South Africa 
(independent in 1961). Together, Basutoland (independent as Lesotho in 1966), Bechuanaland 
(Botswana, 1966) and Swaziland (1968) received over £500,000 of funding in the first five 
years of Freedom from Hunger, much of it through Oxfam and Christian Aid.50 
 The effects on the NGOs themselves were significant. Freedom From Hunger 
‘profoundly influenced the philosophy and approach of Oxfam’.51 In 1960, Oxfam disbursed 
hardly any of its funds to long-term aid, but in that year it stated categorically that ‘aid must go 
beyond philanthropy’.52 It committed to raising £500,000 through Freedom From Hunger for 
agricultural projects over the next three years, but this soon rose to £1.8 million.53 While most 
of this was spent on overseas aid, over the same period it went from being an organisation that 
spent much of its money on refugees, many of whom were in Europe, to one that was disbursing 
over £750,000 to Africa alone.54 By the end of the first phase of Freedom From Hunger, Oxfam 
saw no end to its continued expansion. Its Director, H. Leslie Kirkley could imagine that 
commercial enterprise might set a limit on their expansion, but such ‘negative thinking’ was 
not appropriate for a charity for which continual expansion amidst a world experiencing 
suffering and poverty was both ‘natural and right’.55 
Yet while charities such as Oxfam imagined unlimited adventures in the post-imperial 
world order, the most frequent recipients of their funding would continue to be governments 
and missions. To provide just one snapshot, in the year from October 1962 Oxfam increased 
its activities in Basutoland. Approximately just under one-third of its assistance to the Territory 
went to private initiatives run by limited companies or other international agencies such as SCF 
working on the ground themselves or in partnership with local voluntary groups or missions. 
Around another third went directly to colonial government departments or officially-sanctioned 
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development schemes such as those of the Co-operative Banking Union. And a final third went 
to larger-scale agricultural training schemes, so that the charity supported the educational wings 
of broader technical assistance packages endorsed by intergovernmental agencies such as the 
FAO. Similar proportions are evident each year for the much larger Bechuanaland, with non-
state recipients including the London Missionary Society, the British Red Cross, and the United 
Free Church of Scotland. But the trend towards official forms of assistance was clear.56 As it 
poured hundreds of thousands of pounds over the course of the decade into an officially-
sanctioned development plan in Bechuanaland it is difficult to see how it could present itself 
as the ‘alternative’ to top-down, technocratic assistance that it would later claim.57 Indeed, it 
was obvious to many within Oxfam that it was both implicated within the wider structures of 
a new developmentalism and yet was also the key to the survival of the traditional voluntary 
organisations associated with an earlier civilising mission. 
 Other NGOs followed suit. Christian Aid was guided by the World Council of Churches 
which embraced the Freedom From Hunger agenda at its inception.58 It worked closely with 
missions and national Christian councils which provided all sorts of introductions to 
government-backed schemes across Africa.59 The more ‘establishment’ SCF (its patron was 
Queen Elizabeth II) found that Freedom From Hunger funds meant it had to find new projects 
in order to avoid being seen not spending its income.60 Very soon, its portfolio had expanded 
and its operations on the ground resembled the schemes supported by Oxfam and Christian 
Aid.61 The sector as a whole, then, was quickly transformed by Freedom From Hunger, making 
it appear that radical changes were taking place in humanitarian’s embrace of development. 
Yet, through Freedom From Hunger, there were to be important continuities in the relationships 
they conducted with mission and empire. 
 
 
Just as the new institutions of international aid invited the charities in, so too did a second 
important set of institutions ask for their assistance: colonial governments. For reasons not 
always in accord with UN initiatives, the late colonial state also shared an interest in the 
promotion of charity. Again, through no co-ordinated planning, the links between official and 
the unofficial sectors were nevertheless consolidated. The schemes promoted were diffuse and 
varied. In the run up to decolonisation SCF, for instance, was encouraged to tackle discordant 
elements of colonial youth through the establishment of boys homes across the empire. First in 
Malaya in 1946, but then in Somaliland, Sudan, Uganda and – most controversially – in Kenya 
during Mau Mau it set up ‘places of safety’ to control and contain, or ‘rehabilitate’, troublesome 
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adolescents.62 Freedom From Hunger’s schemes were much less punitive but they nevertheless 
further increased this concentration on the countries of the Commonwealth. Ninety-five of the 
135 Freedom From Hunger projects funded in the first five years were put forward by 
departments of government, particularly in British or ex-British territories. When colonial 
governments themselves did not put in the requests, the machinery of international government 
provided the same function, especially when missionary organisations were too weak to be able 
to set out a development project for British backing. Instead, Freedom From Hunger allied the 
NGOs to FAO Projects, giving them ‘an entrée to the governments of the under-developed 
countries which voluntary agencies did not always have’.63 
This heightened proximity between charity and government can be seen most clearly 
through Oxfam’s, and to a lesser extent Christian Aid’s, activities in the High Commission 
Territories of southern Africa. Freedom From Hunger ushered NGOs into countries all around 
the world, but in southern Africa it set a number of precedents for co-operation between charity, 
the colonial state and international governance that would subsequently be witnessed across 
the rest of the continent. It is not difficult to understand why the NGOs wished to get involved 
in the High Commission Territories. As committed liberal internationalists they were always 
likely to be opposed to the anti-apartheid policies of the Republic of South Africa which 
economically dwarfed its neighbours, Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland. The 
Territories had been formally separated from the RSA in the 1931 Statute of Westminister, but 
by placing them under the administration of the High Commissioner rather than the Colonial 
Office they never received the same levels of investment of those colonies falling under the 
Colonial Development and Welfare Acts. Support for the High Commission Territories in the 
run-up to independence therefore became a popular political cause. In the face of perceived 
inaction by the British government many groups and individuals chose to support the 
economically weak against the strong at a time when the Republic’s Nationalist government 
also reinforced its apartheid regime. No committed internationalist wanted the three Territories 
to become the latest additions to the racist Bantustans that had been set up in the 1950s as 
impoverished, ethnically segregated ‘homelands’.64Liberal, progressive sympathies may well 
have motivated many seemingly radical NGO interventions, but the complexity of real-world, 
local situations only served to consolidate traditional charitable complicity with official 
administrations. Oxfam, couched its public pronouncements in terms of ‘natural’ duties to 
assisting British territories, though its sympathies were obviously more political. It deliberately 
offered a hand of friendship to political refugees seeking exile in the territories (especially 
across the more porous borders of Bechuanaland) and its staff at headquarters in Oxfam posed 
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with visiting Basutho chiefs on official visits.65 On the ground it supported initiatives such as 
a self-help agricultural scheme in Bechuanaland run by the anti-apartheid activist, Guy Clutton-
Brock. Meanwhile, Christian Aid and War on Want worked closely with Amnesty International 
to help refugees leave the High Commission Territories to a development farm in northern 
Rhodesia.66 Thanks to the accusations made by many sympathisers of the Republic’s regime, 
both Christian Aid and Oxfam came under the scrutiny of the Charity Commissioners who 
were concerned that the NGOs were deliberately politicising their development work.67 
Behind this radical veneer, however, hid a much more deeply embedded relationship 
between state and charity, reminiscent of that between mission and empire.  This connection 
was, therefore, deeply traditional, and yet also a pointer to a new political economy of aid at 
the very ends of empire. Oxfam immediately targeted the High Commission Territories for 
Freedom From Hunger projects. It initially set aside £100,000 for three years though this would 
rise to £500,000 soon afterwards.68 But it spent this money in partnership with the state. The 
Aid Director, Bernard Llewellyn, met with the High Commissioner for the Protectorates, Sir 
John Maud, who assured him that Oxfam would have the full co-operation of the Resident 
Commissioners and further wished to explore ‘the possibility that Oxfam might give further 
large-scale aid to the Protectorates’.69 Duly encouraged, Oxfam appointed its first Field 
Director, T. F. [Jimmy] Betts, in 1961 and gave him ‘roving commission’ to search for projects 
in the Territories.70  
Betts, the brother of Barbara Castle, had  spent 24 years with the colonial service as a 
forestry officer in Nigeria. Along with so many other colonial officials, in the run up to 
independence he sought an alternative career.71 This began at the Fabian Colonial Bureau in 
London, where Betts strengthened his sympathies with African nationalism, particularly 
through a friendship with Tanzania’s future leader, Julius Nyerere.72 As his work for Oxfam 
began he maintained his close links with the British government and the Colonial Office 
assisted his work. He produced what would become known as the ‘Betts’ report’ in Whitehall 
circles.73 This document drew extensively on previous surveys of the region by colonial 
officials, especially those undertaken by Lord Hailey, who followed up his Africa Survey with 
a more detailed examination of the High Commission Territories in 1953 and by Chandler 
Morse’s still more recent effort to set out a path to economic development.74 But in turn, the 
‘Betts’ report’ also informed official thinking. The Colonial Office was thus able to take into 
account NGO activities in setting out its own overseas aid policy as colonial territories 
continued to move towards independence.75 NGOs, as much as think tanks and academics of 
many persuasions, were conduits for the transfer of expertise at the end empire. 76 
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Betts’ 53-page initial report for Oxfam and the Colonial Office was but the precursor 
to a series of proposals that amounted to around one-quarter of the £1.8million of Freedom 
From Hunger projects that Oxfam was committing itself to by 1963.77 The £1million Oxfam 
had soon spent on the three territories (through Freedom From Hunger and from its general 
funds), had all been built from the foundations set by Betts in 1961 when he had committed the 
organisation, like so much official assistance, to ‘long-term aid, given in depth, to a selected 
area’.78 The Colonial Office was understandably well disposed towards this work in the 
Territories.79 As Oxfam and others began to expand their operations, government officials 
began to see in the British NGOs both an alternative source of funding and a mechanism to 
promote the voluntary spirit which it believed would be essential to the soon-to-be independent 
nations. Development planning reports written by the Colonial Office at the end of the 1950s 
rarely mentioned NGOs. By the early 1960s, as the opportunities afforded by Freedom From 
Hunger became more obvious, this changed dramatically.. The Colonial Office worked closely 
with the Basutoland government, for instance, to put together a package of projects that could 
be financed by Freedom From Hunger. Taken in isolation, each of these schemes was quite 
small, though the largest reached into six figures. But taken as a package they totalled over £½ 
million, or about one quarter of the British government’s aid for agricultural projects. Despite 
repeated assurances that voluntary schemes were to be ‘complementary and supplementary’ to 
official aid, the blurring of the lines was becoming apparent to all.80  
The Colonial Office was obliged to set out development plans for many of its 
possessions in the run up to independence, to pave the way for economic as well as political 
autonomy. As in Basutoland Oxfam featured prominently in the Bechuanaland Protectorate 
Development Plan for the three years prior to independence in 1966. While the amounts 
disbursed by the NGO amounted to no more than 10% when all forms of assistance were 
factored in (including loans and the large grants for infrastructure projects) the totals for the 
myriad small agricultural schemes were approaching levels around one-third to one half of the 
amounts spent through the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund.81 
All of this did not yet amount to a transfer of economic and social planning from the 
UK government to the charities. But it did amount to a complex economy of welfare that the 
late colonial state did much to encourage, in practice if not according to an overall strategy as 
to the precise lines demarcating official from unofficial assistance. The NGOs therefore had a 
small but significant presence at the moment when power was handed over to the new 
postcolonial elites. 
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The expansion of charitable assistance after independence was also the product of a third group 
of actors: the new ruling elites. The post-colonial, as much as the late-colonial, state was to be 
an important promoter of western charitable assistance. Indeed, there appeared to be a seamless 
extension of NGOs’ roles conducted alongside and in tune with development more generally. 
Freedom From Hunger encouraged charities to continue working with postcolonial 
governments. As Bechuanaland approached independence, for instance, British NGOs 
collectively pledged a further £500,000 with Christian Aid and Oxfam providing £100,000 
each.82 The ‘gift’ was brokered by the new Ministry of Overseas Development and handed over 
as a package to the Deputy Prime Minister, Quett Masire.83 From this base in southern Africa 
Oxfam spread its activities throughout the continent, first to East Africa and Malawi and then 
setting out a more general set of principles for a base of operations in West Africa.84 As its 
number of Field Officers grew, Oxfam appeared part of the technocratic impulse. It was eager 
to work with postcolonial governments, casting aside some of its previous doubts about its non-
governmental and independent role, and it began to set out a policy on ‘international relations’ 
to better co-ordinate its activities with the UN infrastructure.85 Betts himself moved to East 
Africa where he pioneered schemes of ‘integrated rural development’ that focussed activities 
of all agencies on one particular region or area.86 He was also a strong advocate for making 
Oxfam operational, taking over activities directly. He believed that although many experts had 
stayed on in Africa, not all desired or could find work at the UN yet many were losing their 
positions through the ‘Africanisation’ of the post-independence civil services. NGOs might 
take advantage of such a labour market in the new postcolonial era.  
But as charities and NGOs began to work with postcolonial governments they found 
themselves in ever more complex local circumstances. There would prove to be no real model 
for how NGOs should interact with new governments and older imperial institutions. Just as 
earlier voluntary organisations encountered empire in all its complex and diverse forms, so too 
did NGOs occupy different positions and functions across postcolonial states. There was a wide 
diversity to the patterns of social provision emerging as various actors and organisations jostled 
for position and authority in the exciting if uncertain years following independence. Precisely 
because of this it is difficult to draw general patterns of issues encountered on the ground, 
though charities were becoming increasingly aware of the problems of working with 
government. For instance, they constantly sought to fund discrete projects that did not rely on 
ongoing government support that they suspected would never be forthcoming. Resignedly they 
often had to shrug their shoulders as they took on projects either shelved by the colonial state 
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or not picked up by the postcolonial government that chose to support other ventures in the 
knowledge that Oxfam might be encouraged to persist.87 As Gregory Mann has argued of West 
Africans government formerly under French rule, at the moment of actual independence these 
were states far from being as weak as has often been assumed.88 They took strong, active 
decisions about the allocation of resources, including diverting funds from social welfare 
programmes that they knew could be picked up by the humanitarian agencies. That said, truly 
impoverished states could be the most disarmingly honest about their situation. An official in 
Malawi’s Ministry of Finance admitted that his country’s entire overseas aid budget could only 
be met by outside help and acknowledged that ‘we have therefore to turn to organisations such 
as Oxfam’.89 The former French territory, Upper Volta, basically invited Oxfam in, knowing 
that it had so few resources itself to deal with some of the worst poverty levels in the world.90 
Yet even the most discrete form of charitable assistance could also become intertwined 
not only with postcolonial politics but with broader geo-political considerations too. One 
extended example tells the story of many. In 1966, Oxfam began work on a school feeding 
programme in Kenya that was quickly beset with problems. There was lack of co-ordination 
with one of its partners, the original instigators of the scheme, the US-based Catholic Relief 
Services (CRS). Personnel problems saw a particularly unproductive relationship develop 
between the scheme’s administrator, Mrs Haggie, the wife of a settler colonial, and the officials 
of the Nairobi City Council as well as the national civil service. The scheme blurred the line in 
a highly problematic manner between the voluntary and the official sector, leading to 
arguments as to whether Oxfam or the National Council of Social Service (in turn under the 
aegis of the Ministry of Co-operatives and Social Services) was in control of the scheme. And 
Oxfam naively developed a commercial food supplement, Supro, without fully considering the 
conflicts of interests bound to arise once it began to distribute its own product through the 
schools. The scheme itself failed to reach the very poorest children and it showed few signs of 
becoming self-sufficient, a key criterion for long term development. It also fell foul of the push 
for Africanisation when the Secretary General of the trade union movement and politician 
Clement Lubembe, interfered and attempted to have all the funding and staffing decisions 
placed at his discretion through his largely self-appointed role as President of the National 
School Feeding Council. To complicate matters still further, Lubembe had long been trying to 
develop close links with the US labour movement and the US more generally. He preferred the 
CRS to run the scheme as this potentially opened the door to the far more attractive proposition 
of more substantial USAID funds. But Oxfam was unwilling to cede control to its original 
contact, since the CRS Programme Director for Kenya, Dick Wissolick, had earlier pulled CRS 
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out of the Supro collaboration, probably because it would have hampered the distribution of 
US agricultural food surpluses as food aid through CRS. That Wissolick was able to act so 
independently in his interactions between CRS, Oxfam, the Nairobi Council and the Kenyan 
government was also due to what most felt to be his close connections to the US Central 
Intelligence Agency. Unsurprisingly, the overseas aid director assessed the scheme as ‘a costly 
attempt to fly before we can walk’ and in this case at least, Oxfam was eventually relieved to 
pull out in 1969.91 
NGOs were never able to plot their own course through these complex landscapes of 
institutions and interests all shaping newly independent African countries. Yet these other 
actors too were also seeking to mould the activities of NGOs to suit their own myriad purposes. 
In the High Commission Territories, problems persisted as NGOs consolidated their presence. 
The issue in Botswana and Lesotho was less the sheer complexity of the individual schemes 
(though this was a problem too), but more the way in which NGO involvement was subject to 
the machinations of governmental and intergovernmental politics and planning. Christian Aid 
and Oxfam found themselves involved in the sorts of top-down development planning such as 
dam  building to which they otherwise pitched themselves as the alternative.92 Judging from 
the letters of thanks sent by government officials Botswana’s new leaders were extremely 
grateful for another source of income.93 But this income came through varying degrees of co-
ordination produced by other, more powerful agents. Most importantly, just prior to 
independence in 1966, the UN began to plan a role for its own departments once the British 
state had pulled out. Its Special Committee on Decolonization (the Committee of 24) wanted 
to create a special fund for the three territories, something which the British government only 
reluctantly supported given its own preparations for a bilateral aid (ie loans) programme.94 The 
British also wished to avoid being seen to give too much support to the countries as it did not 
want to offend the South Africans. These diplomatic considerations in turn restricted the 
ambitions of the UN in the region. While these dynamics prevented the articulation or 
implementation of an overall development strategy for the three countries, which remained in 
desperate need of some form of assistance, what they did do was encourage the development 
of a larger number of smaller – and uncoordinated – schemes. These could be supported by the 
politically neutral Freedom From Hunger Campaign and be part-funded by NGOs such as 
Oxfam and Christian Aid which could also claim a more impartial interest in development.  
Just as they had prior to independence, then, each project on its own might therefore 
appear as a charitable intervention with few other implications, but taken as a whole they 
constituted a package of charitable aid most appropriate for the politically toxic issue of the 
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economic and social development of South Africa’s precarious anti-apartheid neighbours.95 
More generally, the parameters were also being put in place for charities (with their all-too-
imprecisely defined roles) to flourish in the postcolonial world as much as their predecessors 
had in the colonial. 
 
 
These extraordinarily complex examples of aid on the ground can be repeated over and over 
again across the whole continent. Such complexity was not in itself a problem. So long as it 
was possible to assess with precision what type of project and what type of inter-relationship 
actually worked best, then models for future action and intervention could be mapped out.  
Indeed, this question of ‘scaling up’ from the specific to the general – from the isolated and 
local to the continent-wide – has arguably been the utopian driver behind much 
developmentalism over several decades. The more precise problem in the 1960s, though, was 
that no one knew for sure what constituted effective aid or how NGOs should work with 
communities and governments. In the absence of such knowledge, the charities ran ‘hither and 
thither’ across the continent, as Oxfam’s Aid Appraiser put it at the end of the Development 
Decade.96 They had no co-ordinated plan of action or overall sense of the appropriate balance 
between government and charity. Projects were known not to work and in extreme cases, 
problems were worsened. The examples cited above are but the more everyday instances of the 
more spectacular forms of complexity seen in the likes of the Nigerian civil war at the end of 
the 1960s. Here, NGOs largely sided with the Biafran rebels in the oil-rich east of the country 
in their independence struggle with the Nigerian government, only to be exploited in such a 
way that they helped extend the conflict with further loss of life and more human suffering.97 
Likewise, in Tanzania, Michael Jennings has traced how idealist support for Nyerere’s Ujamaa 
in the 1970s ultimately led to the NGOs becoming ‘surrogates’ of an increasingly authoritarian 
state.98 
The problems of complexity and diversity were not overcome despite efforts to better 
understand NGO ‘effectiveness’. One problem was that the line between assessing the 
effectiveness of a project and advertising its successes as part of a wider publicity campaign 
was not always apparent. Oxfam commissioned the journalist, Peter Gill, to provide an 
‘independent investigation’ of its Freedom From Hunger projects in 1970. But his eight-week 
whistle stop tour from Calcutta to Peru was never going to provide any more depth than what 
Oxfam required in its subsequent glowing and nicely packaged publication, Drops in the 
Ocean.99 Behind the scenes, there had been murmurings of disquiet for some time. At Oxfam, 
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Betts had long offered ‘devastating’ critiques of what he considered to be ‘ill-researched, 
bureaucratically hatched, high cost schemes’.100 As early as 1963, British civil servants were 
raising concerns about the sustainability of Freedom From Hunger projects.101 In 1966, the 
Ministry of Overseas Development initiated a survey of schemes in Botswana, by D. S. 
Thornton, Reader in Agricultural Economics at the University of Reading.102 In 1968, Oxfam 
appointed its first Aid Appraiser, Bernard Llewellyn, a close ally of Betts within the 
organisation. He constantly bemoaned the wastefulness of much of Oxfam’s spending and its 
overall lack of co-ordination and strategic direction.103 Other charities were slower off the 
mark, though eventually most would begin to offer rudimentary assessments of their projects. 
Yet the significance of these early aid assessments is less to do with the technical 
precision of their findings than in how they were received. In the absence of objective criteria 
for measuring the value of aid, ambiguity always enabled success to be claimed. The way 
reports were interpreted within and across institutions was more important than their actual 
content. At Oxfam, for instance, Llewellyn’s concerns about misspent funds, inappropriate 
relationships with governments and lack of measurable objectives were more often aired than 
acted upon.104 Staff chose instead to retain a hope for the success of the next pragmatic project 
put before a grant committee. Likewise, at Christian Aid an extensive investigation of its 
activities in Botswana found a variety of problems and inefficiencies in the delivery of aid that 
called into question the whole validity of its operations in the country.105 The author of the 
report nevertheless concluded that with just a few tweaks and adjustments, all of his identified 
failings could be eradicated and future success would be assured. Despite evidence to the 
contrary, then, success was proclaimed in Botswana by this NGO and, indeed, for many years 
after by the wider international aid community. 
It is this mixture of critique and optimism that lies behind the more general reaction to 
assessment. Most significant was the FAO’s commissioning of J. A. Ponsioen of the Institute 
of Social Studies in The Hague. Taking its cue from the comprehensive review of the entire 
structure of development within the official agencies of the UN at the end of the 1960s, the 
FAO was concerned to know how its money had been spent over the first decade of Freedom 
From Hunger. Ponsoien found that, overall, success had been partial, though in some areas 
‘substantial’. Nevertheless, he identified a litany of problems that included the absence of 
communication, co-ordination and complementarity between agencies, the lack of technical 
skills of many NGOs, confusion over the total assistance given by various donors to any one 
project, the paternalistic attitude of certain agencies, the imposition of too many restrictive 
conditions upon recipients, the reliance on ‘impressions’ and ‘feelings’ about projects by NGO 
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staff, and the absence of evaluations and the related willingness to report successes rather than 
failures.106 Yet none of this was enough to stop the FAO renewing its commitment to working 
with NGOs. Freedom From Hunger was extended in 1970 for a further ten years to cover the 
Second Development Decade. 
Nevertheless, Freddie Lees, the secretary to the NGOs’ umbrella body, VCOAD, was 
taken aback by Ponsoien’s findings. He pushed for all the NGOs to discuss the criticisms of 
aid effectiveness, which he believed amounted to a ‘crisis’.107Yet individual NGOs were 
unwilling to respond. Members of VCOAD accepted the need for greater co-ordination, for 
better field management, for more appraisal and for better record keeping. These 
acknowledgements of the problem became key drivers for the further professionalization of the 
sector in measuring aid effectiveness and reflecting on the changing policies of the NGO 
contribution.108 But there was always a defensiveness to their partial acceptance of a problem 
and an unwillingness to lose their independence. As Lees put it, ‘it is the very strength of the 
NGOs – their flexibility, their freedom, the comparative absence of bureaucracy – all 
productive of so many benefits, that equally gives rise to the defects that have been listed’.109 
Ultimately, he believed the ‘lack of reaction of most of the organisations’ to the Ponsioen study 
was ‘due to their need to clarify their own thinking about the place and role of their project in 
the development process’.110 
At the end of the first decade of Freedom From Hunger, then, NGOs had participated 
in the redefinition of humanitarianism to incorporate long term aid as well as immediate relief 
in times of emergency. In so doing they had created a space for themselves to occupy in 
development that was ready to receive ever more funds and lead to the massive expansion of 
NGOs in subsequent decades. But just at the point when all were ready for this to happen most 
of the key players were still unsure as to what, precisely, worked on the ground and what the 
relationship to postcolonial and international governance should be. 
 
 
The history of charitable humanitarianism presented here has been very much a British one. 
Certainly, there is much to suggest its more general applicability is limited. The voluntarist 
tradition was not always as strong in other contexts. The French empire, for instance, lacked 
the same degree of enrolment of charities in the administration of its more limited social 
welfare programmes. US humanitarianism was shaped to a far greater extent by the imperatives 
of the Cold War rather than the legacies of empire, though the two are inseparable, and bodies 
such as USAID demonstrate the far greater importance of official funding being channelled 
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deliberately and purposefully through the voluntary sector for state interests. The same was 
true for countries without imperial traditions, with the Scandinavian governments in particular 
– arguably for more progressive ends – being keen to expand their development agenda. But 
as has been seen, aid to individual countries, and even particular projects, was usually received 
from a variety of sources. NGOs worked in communication with one another, and British 
charities funded schemes alongside their American and European counterparts, often according 
to similar principles, practices and ways of thinking. British missions had long worked with 
their counterparts from other countries, especially Germany. The Cold War created a space for 
aid to be represented as apolitical leading to the embrace of development by women’s groups 
and other types of voluntary association the world over. And ‘small’ states such as Ireland, 
with limited resources and different experiences of empire, nevertheless saw in the 
development decades, opportunities for humanitarian agencies to make their mark on a world 
stage otherwise dominated by the superpowers. There may have been many reasons for 
embracing the world of NGOs, but embrace them is what many governments and 
intergovernmental organisations did. 111 
 For all the specificities of the British case, then, it becomes more useful to consider 
NGO policy and practice as much a transnational phenomenon than the comparable products 
of different national societies.112 This was noted at the end of the first development decade 
when the World Bank published its report of the Commission on International Development. 
Lester Pearson’s Partners in Development focused on official aid, but he also noted the 
growing importance of the private voluntary sector. While official development assistance was 
calculated to fluctuate between $6 and $7 billion per year in the late 1960s, NGOs were 
believed to be handling up to £1billion annually, at least $700 million of which was raised from 
private sources.113 The ‘partners’ in the title of the report referred to the global South generally. 
But the descriptor was perhaps more aptly applied to the charities and NGOs which had now 
become very much a part of the wider machinery of aid and development.  
Subsequent investigations into the aid industry have continued to praise the distinctive 
contribution of the unofficial sector and have reaffirmed the logic of partnership found in 
Pearson. However, much less recognised is what has been set out in this article: that NGOs 
were very much a part of the governance of development at the launch of the modern era of 
international aid. There was an embrace of charity long before the aid business was recognised 
and critiqued by many scholars following in the wake of James Ferguson’s study of Lesotho in 
the period after that examined here.114 Indeed, by positioning the 1960s as a moment of 
acceleration of processes well underway throughout the middle decades of the twentieth 
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century it is possible to see the continuities from empire and the manner in which charity 
consolidated rather than invented its position in the alleviation of poverty. 
 Yet none of these points explains why NGOs and charities came to have such a 
considerable, if uncertain, presence. Notwithstanding the fact that charities were subjected to 
the differing agendas of nation states and the institutions of the Cold War’s world order, they 
did not consistently operate on the ground utilising practices and forms of knowledge that 
coherently connected their activities to wider narratives of modernisation-theory inflected 
developmentalism. To be sure, there was a space for charity created within such a system but 
it is the uncertainties as to what NGOs’ precise role was to be that is key here. In this essay I 
have argued that it was NGOs’ ambiguous role at the conjunctural moment of decolonisation 
and development that provides a causal explanation for their subsequent expansion. In the 
former British imperial possessions across Africa charities were ‘doing good’ in a whole 
variety of pragmatic and uncoordinated ways as funding from Freedom From Hunger poured 
in. These were incredibly diverse, often incoherent, and involved a whole series of intersections 
with international agencies, colonial officials, newly independent governments, social 
entrepreneurs, local elites, voluntary groups and faith-based organisations. All of these 
recognised the ability of NGOs to work on the ground, to be pragmatic and to be flexible, key 
characteristics which would come to be celebrated as the NGOs’ ‘alternative’ route to 
development. But if this was a model of development, it was one in which no one was sure 
what worked and no one knew what the overall purpose of the non-state sector was to be. The 
story here is reminiscent of  the ‘unruly practices’ that Stoler argues to have characterised the 
complexities of everyday colonialism.115 But the phrase too captures the messy 
implementations of international aid and development policies by charities operating within a 
familiar if different world order.  
 It is the confusing, complex and contradictory nature of NGO projects that lies behind 
the embrace of the sector. It was in the interests of donors, aid workers, charity staff, colonial 
officials, post-independence political elites, international agency employees, ex-pat volunteers 
and missionaries not to put too fine a definition on the role and scope of charitable intervention. 
As disputes arose over which projects yielded the greatest returns and all those with a stake in 
any one project defended that which they valued, then ultimately all types of project continued, 
and all agents persisted in projecting onto the NGO presence their hopes and plans for the 
future of development. 
What has emerged is an ever-expanding sector that continues to mean different things 
to different people. One consequence is an ongoing debate within the NGO community about 
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the definition of humanitarianism and the appropriate mix of emergency relief and long-term 
assistance. There are debates too about whether NGOs can intervene, about the closeness of 
unofficial to official forms of governance and the extent to which NGOs have become the 
auxiliaries to new forms of empire, especially after the rise of the security agenda.116 But in all 
of this NGOs continue their seemingly inexorable expansion, their pragmatism and flexibility 
meaning that they can also respond and adapt to any criticism thrown at them. This is not to 
deny the undoubted good work that they continue to do, and the tremendous effects they can 
have on individual lives where their projects have obviously worked. But it is to acknowledge 
that the essentially ambiguous nature of their myriad projects and programmes has been key to 
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